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Abstract
This study examines the influence of corporate board composition in
the form of representation of outside independent directors on firm
economic performance in Bangladesh. Two hypotheses are developed
to examine the relationship among composition of board memberships
including independent directors and firm performance. An observation
of 274 Bangladeshi firm-years is used in the study. A linear regression
analysis is used to test the hypotheses. Results reveal that the outside
(independent) directors cannot add potential value to the firm’s
economic performance in Bangladesh. The idea of the introduction
of independent directors may have benefits for greater transparency,
but the non-consideration of the underlying institutional and cultural
differences in an emerging economy such as Bangladesh may not result
in economic value addition to the firm. The findings provide an insight
to the regulators in their quest for harmonization of international
corporate governance practices.
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1

Introduction

Bangladesh actively pursues a regulatory environment that aligns its
corporations with international accepted corporate governance best practice.
This study challenges the taken-for-granted assumption in this strategy
that corporate governance principles derived in advanced economies can be
assumed to transfer unproblematically to emerging economies. Rather it is
argued when examining corporations in the Bangladeshi context, where the
legal form of the corporation is comparable with that of advanced economies,
contextual features undermine such considerations.
A sample of 274 Bangladeshi firms is observed to determine the
relationship among board composition, independent directors and firm
performance. We argue that with respect to corporate board composition, the
representation of outside independent directors on boards in Bangladesh
cannot add economic value to Bangladeshi firms.
The concept of public limited companies is universal. Public limited
companies emerged in the mid-nineteenth century as a form of business
ownership that enabled a greater potential to raise capital and to limit
investors’ risk to their respective equity investments. Historically public
limited companies were controlled by their owners, either through direct
management or through direct control of management by owners (Mintzberg,
1984). However, as the size of limited companies grew, direct owner involvement
was no longer practical. With the increase and dispersion of ownership and the
cessation of direct involvement in corporations’ management, a profession of
management emerged (Berle and Means 1932). Consequently, the ownership
control of the modern corporation is vested in the hands of management leading
to a so-called managerial hegemony (Mintzberg, 1984). This creates an agency
problem of aligning the interests of shareholders with that of management.
To mitigate the agency problem, Rose (2005) argues that the corporate
board plays a key role in supervising management and aligning their interests
with the interests of shareholders. The board is considered to be a primary
internal corporate governance mechanism (Brennan, 2006), as the board
monitors and supervises management, and gives management strategic
guidelines. It may act to review and ratify management’s proposals (Jonsson,
2005). A board works to enhance the firm performance and enact legally vested
responsibilities and fiduciary duties (Zahra and Pearce II, 1989). The board’s
expertise can also spot problems early and may “blow the whistle” (Salmon,
1993). There is a lacuna of studies as to whether the composition of boards of
directors can meet these stated responsibilities in the same ways in differing
market contexts and jurisdictions in which they operate.
Corporate governance convention adopted from advance markets’
codes and principles in fulfilling the role of a board require executive and
non-executive directors to work together. It is assumed that boards without
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non-executive directors act as a rubber stamp, and are dominated by the
Chief Executive Officer (CEO), and are plagued with conflicts of interests
(Weidenbaum, 1986). Jensen (1993, p 421) argues that the “board culture is
an important component of board failure”.
The wave of corporate scandals, for example, Enron, WorldCom
and HIH lead to the question as to what composition of board is best able
to monitor management (Mizruchi, 2004, p 614; Brick et al., 2006, p 421).
Enron, WorldCom and HIH management were all involved in questionable
accounting practices which were undetected by their respective boards (Main,
2002; Lawrence, 2004; Kaplan and Kiron, 2004; Solomon, 2007). Regulatory
corporate governance reports and codes; for example, Sarbanes-Oxley Act
2002 in United States; Cadbury Report 1992, Higgs Report 2003 and Smith
Report 2003 in the United Kingdom and CLERP 9 and the Ramsay Report
2001 in Australia advocate many boardroom reforms. The Higgs Committee
recommended the independence of outside directors be tested. There is a
widespread response to the Higgs Committee Recommendations (Kirkbride
and Letza, 2005). Consequently, many countries around the world undertook
corporate governance reforms.
As part of reform movements, in 2006 Bangladesh introduced a hybrid
regulation which is nomenclature as the Corporate Governance Notification
(CGN). This CGN follows a western model requiring appointments on a
corporate board of at least one-tenth of the total directors subject to a minimum
of one as an independent director (Rashid and Lodh 2008). Non-compliance
requires an explanation. This regulation in Bangladesh is of interest because
over the past decades an overwhelming proportion of corporate governance
literature has concentrated on advanced economies with developed financial
and legal systems (Ararat and Yurtoglu, 2006). Although there exist several
studies on corporate governance in less developed and emerging economies
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Sarkar et al. 1998; Asian Development Bank 2000;
Rwegasira 2000; Gibson, 2003; Denis and McConnell, 2003; Machold and
Vasudevan, 2004; Yammeeri et al. 2006), in the context of Bangladesh there
are very few studies on corporate board practices and governance. This study
extends the literature on corporate board practices and firm performance
by providing evidence from this emerging economy. In particular, this study
attempts to investigate whether board composition in the form of outside
independent directors as considered in advanced systems, can influence firm
economic performance in Bangladesh.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
background literature of this study. Section 3 elaborates on the institutional
background of corporate board practices in Bangladesh. Section 4 discusses the
methodology and definitions of variables for the analysis. Section 5 presents
empirical results. Section 6 discusses the limitations of this study and the
conclusions drawn.
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Background Literature
The United Kingdom Cadbury Report (Cadbury, 1992, p. 15) defined corporate
governance as “the system by which companies are directed and controlled”,
including board practices and composition and their relationship to firm
performance. Agency literature views management as opportunistic (Jensen
and Meckling, 1976) arguing that an individual is self-interested and selfopportunistic, rather than altruistic. It assumes that due to the separation of
ownership and control, managers (agents) will not align their interests in the
firm with that of the owners, being driven by self-interest. Unless restricted
from doing otherwise, management will undertake self-serving activities that
could be detrimental to the economic welfare of the principals (Deegan, 2006,
p 225). It is argued that boards comprising outside independent directors will
counter the agency problem by being able to monitor any self interested actions
by managers (Zahra and Pearce II, 1989; Bathala and Rao, 1995; Nicholson
and Kiel, 2007; Kaymak and Bektas, 2008). This may in turn enhance firm
performance (Luan and Tang, 2007). The agents will be motivated, however,
to work in the interests of owners only if there is an oversight incentive to do
so in the form of independent directors who set the tone for less opportunistic
behaviour by managers. It is argued that in so doing, outside independent
directors may provide more skills and knowledge for the benefit of the
corporation.
Earlier Studies on Board Composition
It is widely debated in the corporate governance literature as to whether board
composition in the form of representation of outside independent directors may
add any economic value to the firm (Kesner et al., 1986; Hermalin and Weisbach,
2003; Petra, 2005). Prior research on board composition mainly focused on
firms in advanced economies (Guest, 2008). Studies for example by Kaplan and
Reishus (1990), Byrd and Hickman (1992), Brickley et al. (1994), and Beasley
(1996) found a positive impact from appointing outside independent directors
onto the board. Kesner et al. (1986) found that, although independent directors
are not involved in illegal acts, adding outside independent directors cannot
lessen a firm’s illegal acts. Fernandes (2005) documented that the firms with
non-executive directors have less agency problems and have a better alignment
of shareholders and managers’ interests. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) show
that the firm share price goes up when an additional outside director is
appointed. Denis and Sarin (1999), in a study using a time-series analysis over
a 10-year period, found that the changes in ownership and board structure are
correlated with one another. Changes in ownership and board structure are
strongly related to top executive turnover, prior share price performance, and
corporate control threats. Cotter et al. (1997) studied the role of independent
79

AABFJ | Volume 4, no. 1, 2010

outside directors during takeover attempts by tender offer. They found that
independent outside directors enhance target shareholder’s gains from tender
offers and a majority of independent directors are more likely to use resistance
strategies to enhance shareholders’ wealth.
The empirical evidence of outside independent directors and firm
performance is mixed. Some studies, such as Schellenger et al. (1989), Daily
and Dalton (1992), Tian and Lau (2001) and Luan and Tang (2007) found
that having more outside independent directors on the board improves firm
economic performance. Other studies including Baysinger and Butler (1985),
Chaganti et al. (1985), Rechner and Dalton (1986), Zahra and Stanton (1988),
Fosberg (1989), Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Barnhart et al. (1994), Grace
et al. (1995), Barnhart and Rosenstein (1998), Dalton et al. (1998), Dalton and
Daily (1999), Davidson III and Rowe (2004), Fernandes (2005), and Cho and
Kim (2007) could not find any relationship between board composition in the
form of representation of outside independent directors and firm performance.
Baysinger and Butler (1985) argued that these differences in findings
may occur due to various factors such as corporate law, managerial talent,
capital markets and the internal capital structure of the firm. In addition,
Zahra and Pearce II (1989) pointed to several reasons for such inconsistencies,
as summarized by Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996, p 239). These include the
consideration of several contextual factors; life cycle, corporate strategy and
effective interaction among board members in decision making. Finkelstein
and Hambrick (1996) also argue that despite such variances, a board may
indirectly influence the firm’s performance by quality of monitoring. Due to the
high degree of diversity of the results of earlier studies on board composition
and firm performance, Dalton and Daily (1999) viewed these results as ‘vexing’,
‘contradictory’, ‘mixed’ and ‘inconsistent’.
As has been stated earlier, the CGN (2006) requires the appointment of at
least one tenth of the total directors, subject to a minimum of one independent
director. Given this requirement, there will be an imbalance of power between
inside and outside directors, dependent upon the board size. A smaller board
is manageable and plays a controlling function, whereas a larger board is nonmanageable and may have greater agency problems and may not be able to act
effectively leaving management relatively free of being controlled (Chaganti
et al., 1985; Jensen, 1993; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). Del Guercio et al.
(2003) reveal that smaller boards with a higher proportion of independent
directors are more effective.
Why Outside Independent Directors?
Independent non-executive directors are appointed from outside and they
should not have any material interest in the firm. Dalton and Daily (1999) and
Fields and Keys (2003) argue that independent directors are appointed based
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on their unique qualifications, expertise and experience. The view is that they
may effectively influence the board’s decisions and ultimately add value to the
firm. It is argued independent directors provide a unique monitoring function
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Bathala and Rao, 1995; Beasley,,
1996). Farrar (2005) suggests independent directors play a useful role in
strategic planning and risk management. It is also recognized that independent
directors share the responsibility to monitor a firm’s financial performance. In
so doing, they have authority to question problems of information asymmetry
(Ozawa, 2006, p 104), and have the power to make recommendations on
executive compensation and dismissal of the CEO following poor performance
(Kesner et al., 1986; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996, p 225; Hermalin and
Weisbach, 2003).
The practicality of appointing independent directors is challenging. There
is no consensus of a common definition of independent director as yet (Brennan
and McDermott, 2004, p 326). They are neither employees of the company,
nor have they any business relationship with the firm (Hulbert, 2003). If the
appointment of independent directors is to achieve these intended functions,
the appointment of such directors must be transparent and at arms’ length.
However, such appointments can be controversial if there are questions as to
the independence of appointments. It is possible that independent directors
are known to the CEO or other inside directors prior to their appointments.
The new outside board members who are proposed by inside board members
may have personal relationships with them (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996,
p 225).
Arguments have been presented challenging the limitations of outside
independent directors. Nicholson and Kiel (2007, p 588) argue that “inside
directors live in the company they govern, they better understand the business
than outside directors and so can make better decisions”. Their argument
is one of information asymmetry between inside directors and outside
independent directors. They argue that a lack of day to day inside knowledge
may reduce the control role of the independent directors in the firm, and that
the independent directors may fail to perform because of appropriate support
by the inside directors (Cho and Kim, 2007). Brennan (2006) also questions
the value of outside independent directors, as they may not be competent to
perform their assigned tasks in that they are part-timers and do not have
inside information of the firm.
The problem of finding truly outside independent directors has been noted.
Flanagan (1982) argues that 80 percent of the outside directors’ candidature in
the United States is known by either the CEO or by other board members prior
to their appointment. Patton and Baker (1987) and Jensen (1993) argue that
outside directors are the creatures of CEOs and are more likely to be aligned
with top management rather than that of the interests of shareholders, as
top management have great influence over who sits on the board. However,
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Brickley et al. (1994) argue that due to reputational concerns and fear of
lawsuits, outside directors may be motivated to represent shareholders, but
that the ability to issue commands and instructions by these directors is
limited (McNulty and Pettigrew, 1996). Dayton (1984) argues that outside
independent directors only monitor in the case of crisis. Outside independent
directors may serve on too many boards (Core et al., 1999).
Institutional Background of Corporate Board Practices in Bangladesh
While corporate governance reforms in Bangladesh are consistent with
global reforms concerning outside independent directors (cf., CGN 2006),
the Bangladeshi institutional environment lags behind. Typically owners
often have significant stakes of shares and dominate the board of directors.
This form of governance is known as the ownership control approach and
is in contrast to corporate governance practices that make use of outside
independent directors. Highly concentrated ownership and consequential
board influence can have dominating features where there exists a lack of
takeover regulations, an inefficient market, and transaction costs associated
with takeover processes. Corporate governance in Bangladesh is not without
such characteristics. In Bangladesh, an absence of a liquid capital market and
other dominant control mechanisms including compensation in the form of
share options, are also major features.
In general corporate boards in Bangladesh are one-tiered or management
without the use of any supervisory board. Both executive and non-executive
directors perform duties together in one organisational layer. This is not
commonly seen in advanced systems of corporate governance. An indication
of CEO duality in corporate board supervision is an example of such a onetiered structure. Similarly there exists CEO duality in some listed companies
in Bangladesh.
Methodology and Definition of Variables
Methodology
The Securities and Exchange Commission Bangladesh (SECB) announced a
corporate governance notification (CGN 2006). One of the requirements of that
notification is to appoint outside independent directors onto boards, otherwise
an explanation is needed for any non-compliance. Many firms subsequently
complied with this guideline. Based on the availability of company annual
reports, this study considers 90 non-financial firms listed on the Dhaka Stock
Exchange (DSE) during the period 2005 to 2009. This represents 38.3% of the
total DSE listed companies as at 31 December 2009. It comprises 61.6% of total
non-financial companies; representing 55% (approximately) of the market
82

Rashid, De Zoysa, Lodh and Rudkin: Board Composition and Firm Performance

capitalization of total non-financial listed firms. A total of 274 observations
are made for this study, as shown in Table 1. The sample consists of a variety
of industries as shown in Table 2.
The audited financial reports from companies are the basis for obtaining
accounting information including total assets, total liabilities and equities, net
sales, net incomes, and operating incomes. The data for board composition and
board size are obtained from directors’ reports. Market values of the closing
share prices are also collected from the DSE web site and from the Monthly
Review of the DSE.
Table 1:
Sample Description
Year

Number of firms in the sample

Observed firm years

90
90
90
90
90

10
90
90
78
6

2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Total observations (Firm years)

274

Table 2:
Industry classification of the sample
Industry

Number of firms in the sample

Observed firm years

Cement
Ceramic
Engineering
Food and Allied
Fuel and Power
Jute
Paper and Printing
Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals
Service and Real Estate
Tannery
Textile
Miscellaneous

3
1
13
17
2
2
3
16
2
4
23
4

9
3
43
48
5
6
9
49
5
15
69
13

Total

90

274

Based on the background literature, two hypotheses are stated as follows:
H1: There is a significant positive relationship between the board
composition and firm performance.
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H2: There is a significant negative relationship between the board size
and firm performance.
Variable Definitions
Dependent Variable: Firm Performance
Dependent variables in this study are the firms’ performances under different
performance measures such as Return on Assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q (a market
based performance measure). Consistent with Yammeesri and Lodh (2004),
Yammeesri et al. (2006) and Rashid and Lodh (2008), ROA is calculated as
‘Earnings Before Interest and Taxes’ (EBIT) scaled by the book value of total
assets. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market value of the firm to the replacement
cost of their assets.
Independent Variable: Board Composition
Board composition in this study refers to the percentage of membership held by
the outside independent directors, which has been considered in prior studies
(Rechner and Dalton, 1986; Zahra and Stanton, 1988). This satisfies the
definition of an independent director as provided in the CGN 2006 issued by
SECB. Independent variable BDCOM is used to denote the board composition.
Control Variables
The considered control variables are as follows; ownership structure, board
size, CEO-duality, firm debt, firm size, firm age and firm growth. The shares
of public limited companies in Bangladesh are not widely held. Apart from a
few controlling ownerships by foreign investors and government and financial
institutions, the public limited companies in Bangladesh are in general mainly
controlled by family members who are founding sponsors and/or directors,
leading to a high degree of ownership control. The company board is generally
formed from the representation of these shareholdings. In our view, family
directors or sponsors are highly influential in appointing any new director in
Bangladesh. Therefore, ownership structure in Bangladesh has a significant
impact on the board’s role of monitoring management, which in turn can
influence firms’ performance. A control variable director shareholdings
ownership (DIROWN) is considered for the percentage of shares owned by the
directors or sponsors.
A control variable board size (LOGBDSIZE) is considered to be the
natural logarithms of total board members. Whether a CEO would have a
great influence on board structure and its capacity to monitor management
depends on the distribution of power between the chairperson of the board and
the CEO (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). A control variable CEO-duality
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(CEOD) is considered as a binary, which is equal to be one (1) if the CEO and
chairperson positions are held by the same individual, otherwise zero (0).
Firm debt may act as a disciplinary device to agency problems which
ultimately can have influence on a firm’s performance (Jensen and Meckling,
1976). Consistent with McConnell and Servaes (1990), Agrawal and Knoeber
(1996), Short and Keasey (1999) and Xu and Wang (1999), a control variable
debt (DEBT) is also considered to identify the impact on firms’ performance. It
is measured as the ratio of Total Debts to Total Assets.
The firm size is an important variable because large firms can be influenced
by having more capacity to generate internal funds (Short and Keasey, 1999),
having a greater variety of capabilities (Majumdar and Chhibber, 1999), and
having problems of coordination which may negatively influence performance
(Williamson, 1967). The natural logarithm of Total Sales is considered as the
firm size (LOGSIZE).
Firm performance can also be influenced by the age of the firms. Older
firms are likely to achieve greater efficiency by reducing costs than younger
firms (Ang et al., 2000). The variable of age (LOGAGE) is defined here as the
natural logarithm of years the firm is on the DSE.
Regression
Model
Specification
Regression
Model
Specification
In order
examine the
between
board composition
and firm performance,
In order
to toexamine
therelationship
relationship
between
board composition
and firm
performance, the following model is developed:

the following model is developed:

Yit = α + β1 BDCOMPit + β 2 DIROWNit + β3 LOGBDSIZEit + β 4CEODit + β5 DEBTit + β 6 LOGSIZEit + β 7 LOGAGEit + ε it

Where,
Where,

• Yit is alternatively ROAit and Tobin’s Qit for ith firm at time t,
Yit is alternatively
ROAit and Tobin’s Qit for ith firm at time t,
• • BDCOMP
it is the board composition,
percentage
of shares
owned by directors for ith firm at time t,
• • DIROWN
BDCOMP
the board
composition,
it is theis
it
• LOGBDSIZEit is the board size for ith firm at time t,
• DIROWNit is the percentage of shares owned by directors for ith firm at
• CEODit is the CEO
duality for ith firm at time t,
time
t,
• DEBT
it is the debt ratio for ith firm at time t,
• • LOGSIZE
ith firm
at time
t, firm at time t,
it is the firm
LOGBDSIZE
issize
thefor
board
size
for ith
it
• LOGAGEit is the firm age for ith firm at time t,
CEOD
is theβiCEO
forcoefficient
ith firmofatithtime
t, and εit is the composite
it
• • α is
the intercept,
is theduality
regression
variable
error
terms,
and
• DEBTit is the debt ratio for ith firm at time t,
• The subscript i represents the different firms and t represents the different years.

•

LOGSIZEit is the firm size for ith firm at time t,

•

LOGAGEit is the firm age for ith firm at time t,

•

α is the intercept, bi is the regression coefficient of ith variable and eit

EmpiricalisResult
the composite error terms, and

• The
subscript i represents the different firms and t represents the
Descriptive
Statistics
different years.

The descriptive statistics of all variables used in the model are shown in Table 3 below:
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of the Sample
Variables
ROA
Tobin’s Q

N

Mean
274
274

0.057
1.290

Minimum

Maximum

-1.494
0.335

0.287
6.226

Std.
Deviation
0.132
0.769

Skewness

Kurtosis

-6.278
2.566

69.833
9.873
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Empirical Result
Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics of all variables used in the model are shown in Table
3.
As per Table 3, average firm performance is 5.7% ranging from negative
149.4% to 28.7% under the ROA performance measure, and 129% ranging from
33.5% to 622.6% under Tobin’s Q performance measure. The average board
composition is found to be 10.9% ranging from 0% to 33.33%. The average
directors’ shareholding is found to be 42.3%, ranging from 0% to 96%. The
average board size is 7 directors, ranging from a minimum of 3 directors to a
maximum of 12 directors. On an average it shows that there is 41.7% incidence
of CEO duality in the observed sample. The average Total Debt to Total Assets
(DEBT) is 77.4% ranging from 7.3% to 561.9%. The average firm size is 5.459
implying an average firms’ sales of Taka 234.86 million. The average firm age
is 18 years ranging from 8 years to 32 years.
The results of the analysis carried out to examine the correlation between
the explanatory variables and are presented in the correlation matrix in Table
4, which demonstrates that none of the explanatory variables is correlated
with another explanatory variable in the model. This is further confirmed by
the scores of variance inflation factor (VIF) which quantifies the severity of
multicollinearity in a regression analysis. A VIF value of ten is considered as
a cut off value for multicollinearity (Gujarati, 2003).

Table 3:
Descriptive Statistics of the Sample
Variables
N
Mean Minimum Maximum
					

Std.
Skewness
Deviation

Kurtosis

ROA

274

0.057

-1.494

0.287

0.132

-6.278

Tobin’s Q

274

1.290

0.335

6.226

0.769

2.566

9.873

BDCOMP

274

0.109

0.000

0.333

0.082

-0.077

-0.751

DIROWN

274

0.423

0.000

0.960

0.190

0.069

0.423

LOGBDSIZE

274

1.857

1.099

2.485

0.304

-0.269

-0.102

CEOD

267

0.416

0.000

1.000

0.494

0.344

-1.896

DEBT

274

0.774

0.073

5.619

0.629

4.061

22.483

LOGSIZE

274

5.459

-4.200

10.724

2.398

-0.937

1.132

LOGAGE

274

2.858

2.079

3.466

0.312

-0.082

-0.836
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Table 4:
Correlation matrix of the explanatory variables
BDCOMP
BDCOMP
DIROWN

DIROWN LOGBDSIZE CEOD

DEBT LOGSIZE LOGAGE

1							
-.060

1						

LOGBDSIZE

.340**

-.028

1					

CEOD

-.211**

.136*

-.111

DEBT

-.123*

-.030

-.033

LOGSIZE

.293**

-.051

.258**

-.084

-.321**

LOGAGE

.237**

.002

.248**

-.219**

.082

1				
.006

1			
1		
.086

1

VIF
1.266
1.027
1.220
1.100
1.082
1.207
1.143

* At 5% level of significance and ** at 1% level of significance respectively.

The model is regressed using linear regression analysis by the SPSS (The
Statistical Package for Social Science). The regression results are presented in
Table 5. Results indicate that there is no significant relationship between board
composition and firm performances in either measure. This implies that the
outside independent directors cannot influence firms’ economic performance.
The results also confirm that board size has a significant negative explanatory
power in influencing firms’ performance under the ROA measure, but it shows
a positive explanatory power in influencing firm performance under Tobin’s
Q measure. This is indicative of information asymmetries between inside and
outside directors. The results further indicate that rather, CEO-duality, Firm
Debt and Firm Size all having significant explanatory power in determining
firm’s performance under the market based performance measure. The results
also show that the firm size has a significant positive explanatory power in
determining firm’s performance in the ROA measure.
The relationship between outside directors and firms’ performance is
not clear explicitly in case of developed economies (Judge et al., 2003). This
study also supports this argument, finding that outside independent directors
are good monitors but cannot add economic value to firms in Bangladesh. It
should however be mentioned that the data were mainly collected from the
companies’ annual reports which may have explanatory power for additional
causes on true companies’ performance. Also, the data were collected from
entities ignoring the underlying differences of their operations, as any two
organisations are not the same. The extreme value of some observed variables
such as EBIT and accumulated income of some firms may have further impacts
on the results. The sample size could have influences on the results as firms
were required to comply with the CGN (2006) notification.
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Table 5:
Board composition and firm performance
under different performance measures
This table presents the summary results of the board composition and
firm performance under different performance measures. Column (a) and
(b) represent the coefficients of performance measures. The t-values are
presented in parentheses.
Dependent Variables

Intercept
BDCOMP
DIROWN
LOGBDSIZE
CEOD
DEBT
LOGSIZE
LOGAGE
Adjusted R2
F-Statistic

(a) ROA

(b) Tobin’s Q

-.078
(-1.061)
.144
(1.560)
.039
(1.087)
-.042
(-1.724)*
.011
(.757)
-.080
(-6.356)***
.020
(6.237)***
.045
(1.934)*
0.302***
17.468***

-1.798
(-5.855)***
0.418
(1.088)
.020
(.132)
0.384
(3.765)***
-.110
(-1.842)*
.886
(16.966)***
.049
(3.731)***
.492
(5.096)***
0.586***
54.887***

* At 10% level of significance, ** at 5% level of significance and *** at 1% level of significance
respectively.

Discussion and Conclusion
This study examines the influence of board composition in the form of
representation of outside independent directors on the firm’s economic
performance in Bangladesh. It is revealed that there is no significant
relationship between board composition in the form of representation of
outside independent directors and firm performance, implying that the
outside independent directors cannot add potential economic value to the
firm in Bangladesh. It is also revealed that the board size has a significant
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negative influence on firm performance under accounting based performance
measures, implying that there are information asymmetries between outside
independent and other directors. Therefore, it is supportive that outside
independent directors of Bangladeshi firms are not able to ensure the checks
and balances of accountability and management activities as implied in the
CGN in 2006. This is consistent with the Cadbury Report 1992 and the Higgs
Report 2003 in the United Kingdom.
In our view, although independent outside directors, in general, do
play an advisory role rather than adding economic value, there is a need for
further exploration as to whether independent directors can provide effective
judgmental contributions to firms. From the analysis we would like to
conclude that the introduction of a hybrid regulation (such as CGN 2006) may
not be an appropriate notification to achieve an intended accountability by the
Bangladeshi corporate sector. Instead, there could be unique institutional and
cultural factors which may be able to further explain Bangladeshi firms. From
a policy perspective, we believe the findings of this study can be helpful for a
provision of additional insight to the regulators in their quest to harmonize
the corporate governance practices in Bangladesh with international best
practices. We suggest for further studies to be carried out by increasing the
sample size and the consideration of institutional, cultural and industry
specific factors in order to identify other influences.
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